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What are the factors that determine the attitude of the Spanish authorities towards the debate on the future of the
European Union? What type of EU would the Aznar government like to see emerging from the European Convention
some time  in  2003  and from the  subsequent  Intergovernmental  Conference  a  year  later?  Surprisingly,  these
questions are rarely addressed in the public domain, which may explain why they are not easily answered.
The difficulty in identifying the priorities of the current Spanish government with regard to the future of the EU is
partly  due to the fact  that Aznar  has never  been  prone to idle  speculation about the future. As leader  of the
opposition, he often expressed irritation and concern at the seemingly unbridgeable gap between EU rhetoric and
practice, arguing forcefully that this could only result in popular disaffection. What is more, in the early 1990s he
frequently berated his predecessor, Felipe González, for paying far more attention to developments in the EU than
to growing economic and political difficulties at home, an accusation he has been careful to avoid once in office. In
addition, conservative politicians are perhaps generally reluctant to indulge in abstract theoretical debate, and Aznar
greatly  admires the  pragmatic,  empirical  approach  to  political  life  that  is  often  associated with  certain  British
traditions, as he recently admitted in a lecture delivered at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. This attitude is clearly
reflected in the section of the official  Spanish presidency programme dedicated to the Convention, which boldly
states that “abstract theoretical debates taken up with the definition of artificial archetypes must be avoided, and
the need to meet citizens’ concerns must constantly be borne in mind”.
If the Aznar government has not been more involved in the debate about the future of Europe, it is also partly due
to the widely held view that Spain has done very well  in the EU in recent years, and is therefore reluctant to
countenance major changes to the status quo. From an official  Spanish government perspective, defence of the
status quo is above all  synonymous with the need to guarantee Madrid’s ability to play a significant role in EU
affairs, and hence to uphold the institutional settlement secured by González at Ioannina in 1994 and confirmed by
Aznar at Nice in 2000. The fact that in an enlarged EU Spain, with a population of only 40 million, will  have 27
weighted votes in Council, only two short of the 29 votes allocated to France, Italy and the United Kingdom, which
have populations of 57-59 million, goes a long way to explaining Aznar’s satisfaction with the outcome of the Nice
Council, even if the settlement reached also entailed sacrificing more MEPs (fourteen) than any other member state.
At the risk of over-simplification, it is possible to argue that in the eyes of the current Spanish government the EU is
essentially about four things: i) the single market and its natural corollary, the single currency; ii) the principle of
social  and economic cohesion; iii) an area for  freedom, security and justice; iv) and the possibility of playing a
significant role in the world. Although the importance attributed to each of these spheres has varied somewhat over
time, it has remained essentially unchanged since Spain’s accession to the EC in 1985. The Spanish presidency
slogan, “más Europa” (more Europe) should thus be understood primarily  in  terms of the EU’s ability  to make
significant progress in these four areas.
As far as the first sphere is concerned, Madrid governments have always been enthusiastic supporters of both the
single market and the single currency. Under González, these twin goals were a catalyst for domestic socioeconomic
reform and modernization; under Aznar, they have become key instruments in the on-going struggle to achieve
greater competitiveness, credibility and self-discipline. Admittedly, the emphasis on the liberalization of the Spanish
economy, which has made Aznar a leading champion of the Lisbon programme, could be construed as being an
ideologically-motivated departure, but is perhaps best attributed to a widely-felt need to respond to the challenges of
globalization and to close the ever-widening innovation gap with the United States.
Secondly, Spain has always held the view that cohesion is an integral part of the acquis communautaire. From a
Spanish perspective, cohesion is more than just the name of an important fund, it is a principle –a philosophy, even-
which should inform all EU policies to take into account the chasm that continues to exist between wealthier and
poorer member states. Although the Spanish economy has been radically transformed since the country’s accession
to the EU in 1986, in 2001 its GDP was still only 83% of the EU-15 average. The Aznar government acknowledges
that nothing will  be the same after enlargement, but refuses to accept that it be undertaken at the expense of
current cohesion policies. From Madrid’s perspective, it is unrealistic to expect the next enlargement to result in no
additional cost, and it is only fitting that the wealthier member states (some of which were the most enthusiastic
proponents of enlargement in the first place, and whose economies will benefit from it most) should bear their full
share of the extra burden.
In private, government officials acknowledge that, since they are not in a position to block enlargement, there is no
point in opposing it in public. This might in any case prompt certain net contributors to the EU budget to blame the
cohesion countries for lack of progress on this front, while at the same time antagonising candidate countries who
might otherwise become valuable allies in the not too distant future. This partly explains why these same officials
never tire of pointing out that enlargement is a popular cause in Spain; indeed according to Eurobarometer number
56, published in  April  2002,  61% of  those  polled are  in  favour,  while  only  18% are  against.  However,  they
conveniently forget to add that this may be because, according to the same source, of all EU citizens, Spaniards feel
amongst the most ill informed about enlargement.
The Aznar  government also attaches special  importance to the development of  the EU as an area of  freedom,
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security and justice. In the 1990s, this concern was largely an expression of the growing need to Europeanize the
on-going struggle against the terrorist organisation ETA. In more recent years, the desire to equip the EU with new
instruments, policies and decision-making procedures in this field has also been fuelled by the need to respond to
the new challenges posed by massive immigration flows, most notably (but not exclusively) across the Straights of
Gibraltar. In the wake of the recent elections in France and the Netherlands, the Madrid government has become
increasingly determined to be seen to be taking action on this front, and has spoken in favour of the EU policing its
external frontiers and of making development aid conditional on a commitment to curbing illegal emigration from
recipient countries. Most recently, Aznar has suggested that court sentences passed in one member state should be
enforceable in others, adding that this type of measure might do more to convince citizens of the relevance of the
EU to their daily lives than would apparently more spectacular decisions such as the inclusion of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights in a future constitutional treaty, a goal which his government also supports.
Finally, Spain has also traditionally been a keen supporter of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in recent
years, it has been strongly in favour of developing a European Security and Defence Policy. (According to recent
polls, maintaining peace and security in Europe tops Spaniards’ list of priorities for EU action). As far as CFSP is
concerned, Madrid’s position has generally been prudent, advocating the establishment of a permanent organ for
planning and analysis, its centralisation in the figure of the secretary general of the Council, and the maintenance of
unanimity  for  decision-making  while  allowing  for  the  introduction  of  constructive  abstention.  Although  Aznar
probably  attaches  even  greater  importance  to  the  transatlantic  relationship  than  his  predecessor  did,  he  is
nevertheless convinced of the need to upgrade Europe’s defence capabilities, even if this has unpalatable budgetary
implications. Indeed Spain’s support for the ESDP could be seen as an acknowledgement of the fact that an increase
in defence expenditure would only be politically viable if couched in terms of Spain’s European commitment.
How do these attitudes and concerns condition the government’s attitude to the debate currently unfolding in the
European Convention? In private Aznar has often expressed the view that it is intellectually and politically dishonest
to talk about a federal Europe unless one is seriously thinking of increasing the EU’s budget well beyond the current
ceiling of 1.27% of member states’ GDP, which would not appear to be the case. In keeping with this attitude, he
has claimed on several occasions that it is immaterial how we label the outcome of the Convention’s labours, given
that  the  existing treaties  already  have  constitutional  implications for  member  states.  (According to  the  latest
Eurobarometer, 64% of Spaniards are in favour and 9% are against a European Constitution, a level of support that
is somewhat below the EU-15 average).
Aznar has made no secret of the fact that in his view the EU is, and should remain, a Union of nation states. Some
critics have argued that since he came to office in 1996 the Madrid view of European integration has become more
intergovernmentalist  and less supranationalist,  a  shift  that  supposedly  explains an  alleged loss of  influence  in
Brussels.  Whether  or  not  this  is  actually  the  case,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that,  according  to  the  latest
Eurobarometer, 41% of Spaniards are in favour of the enlarged EU adopting decisions by unanimity (as opposed to
an EU-15 average of 39%), while 42% favour majority voting (somewhat lower than the EU-15 average of 46%).
Admittedly, the prime minister has been very assertive in his defence of national interest, but this is by no means
new to Spanish policy and a systematic comparison of Madrid’s tactics at the Edinburgh (1992) and Berlin (1999)
councils would no doubt reveal a remarkable degree of continuity. More controversially, perhaps, some critics have
claimed that Aznar is more of a Spanish nationalist than González, an instinct that is supposedly reflected in his
attitude  towards  European  integration.  This  is  a  highly  complex  issue,  which  cannot  be  explored  fully  here.
Nevertheless, it is probably true to say that while González  and his party tended to see Spain as a ‘Nation of
nations’, Aznar and his followers are happier with the concept of a single yet plural (in other words, multilingual and
culturally diverse) Spanish Nation, though they have recently been paying lip-service to the notion of ‘constitutional
patriotism’. (Interestingly, according to the latest Eurobarometer there has been a sharp increase in the proportion
of Spaniards who only identify with their own nationality over the past two years, which currently stands at 38%,
though 56% still  see themselves as both Spanish and European. According to this source, 91% of Spaniards are
proud of their  national  identity, and 72% also express pride in being European). Be this as it may, in practice
González  and  Aznar  have  been  similarly  reluctant  to  allow  Spain’s  regions  to  play  a  significant  role  in  the
formulation of their  European policy, even though they both paid lip service to this cause (in  1993 and 1996,
respectively) when they needed the parliamentary support of certain parties from the regions in order to remain in
office.
Inevitably, centre-periphery relations have had a major impact on Aznar’s thinking about the Laeken mandate to the
Convention with regard to the clarification of competences, and in particular, the role of the regions. The Madrid
government was one of the first to speak out against a rigid catalogue of competences, arguing that it would not be
in tune with the more ‘flexible’ spirit of the Spanish constitution, and was also adamant that national legislation be
respected at all cost. In any case, in recent weeks the Convention has moved away from the debate over a possible
catalogue of  responsibilities,  which  has been  replaced by  a  discussion  of  how best  to  enforce  the  subsidiarity
principle, a trend which clearly favours the official Spanish position.
Another major reason for the Madrid government’s cautious approach to the debate on the future of the EU is that it
is reasonably content with the existing institutional balance. (Curiously, according to the latest Eurobarometer Spain
is the only EU member state in which the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council of Ministers –in
that order- elicit similar levels of trust from citizens). To this one must add the by-now traditional  tendency of
Spanish governments to see themselves as champions of the Community method. Nonetheless, in his Oxford speech
Aznar  was unusually  critical  of  the  current  rotating presidency  of  the  Council,  and joined Chirac and Blair  in
advocating the election of a ‘President of the Union’ from the ranks of former heads of state and government, who
would hold office for a longer period, be it two and a half or five years. (Just in case, he quickly added that he did
not have a particular candidate in mind, not even his friend Blair). A rotating presidential team consisting of five or
six serving heads of government, who would chair the various Council formations, would in turn assist this ‘President
of the Union’. In theory, the problems posed by the twice-yearly rotation would thus be resolved not only for EU
summits but also for all Council formations. More daringly, perhaps, he also suggested that the President should be
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able  to  dissolve  the  European  Parliament  at  the  initiative  of  the  Commission, though  without  elaborating any
further. Some critics have seen the Chirac-Blair-Aznar proposal as a barely-disguised attempt to transform the latter
into a Council secretariat, but in Spain, at least, there is still a very broad consensus in favour of a strong, credible
Commission, which the prime minister does not intend to question. As far as the European Parliament is concerned,
in  his Oxford speech  Aznar  recalled the  low turnouts generally  recorded in  European elections, and urged the
Convention to recognise that citizens identify more readily with national representatives. This is fully in keeping with
the Spanish prime minister’s long-standing concern about the undermining of national parliaments, which he would
like to see addressed by introducing a Charter of National Parliaments and a Code of Conduct that would guarantee
their full participation in the European political process.
Traditionally, Madrid governments did not have to worry unduly about public opinion when it came to formulating
their European policy, a situation that was probably due to a combination of the non-controversial  nature of EU
membership and consistently  low levels of  perceived knowledge about  the  European  project. Nevertheless,  the
current  government  believes it  has been  successful  in  bringing its  policies  more  in  line  with  the  electorate’s
preferences. It is therefore interesting to observe that, while remaining strongly in favour of EU membership, the
latest polls detect that Spaniards are now less likely to want the EU to play a more important role in their daily lives
in future than they were two years ago, and much more likely to wish things to remain as they are. This is yet
another reason, and hardly the least important, why it is safe to assume the Aznar government will  continue to
support a prudent, pragmatic approach to European integration in the months and years to come.
The Elcano Royal  Institute  does not  necessarily  share  the  views expressed by  the  authors of  its
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